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Abstract 
 
We argue that in addition to host corruption per se, as accounted for by the existing 
literature, an explanation of inter-country variation in FDI needs to account for the distance 
between the host and home corruption, which we call relative corruption. We use a large 
matched home-host firm-level panel data-set for 1998-2006 from CEE transition countries. 
Year-specific selectivity corrected estimates suggest that, ceteris paribus, higher relative 
‘grand’ corruption lowers foreign ownership as the returns to investment tends to be lower 
in more corrupt environment. However, after controlling for the selectivity bias, 
knowledge-intensive parent firms are found to hold controlling ownership, as the difficulty 
of successful joint venture looms large in more corrupt environment. Results are robust to 
alternative specifications. 
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Bridging the Gap? 
Corruption, Knowledge and Foreign Ownership 
 
1. Introduction 
There is now a widespread recognition that the international transfer of technology is an 
important source of domestic productivity growth, and ultimately higher living standards. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the crucial vehicles by which technology transfer 
occurs (see for example Borensztein et al. 1998, Barrell and Pain (1997)). However, despite 
early optimism, the data suggests that not only are rates of FDI flows into Central and 
Eastern Europe (hereafter CEE countries) lower than had been envisaged, (see Figure 1) but 
international technology transfer that accompanies FDI is also very low. As yet, very little 
has been written on why this is the case. In order to address this, we seek to make a more 
specific contribution in the context  of the literature on FDI and corruption. This is an 
important question in the context of CEE countries, who have relatively low savings and 
investment rates, combined with outdated indigenous manufacturing technology. Foreign 
investment is thus seen as a solution to this problem. However, institutions in the region 
tend to be weak, retaining many characteristics inherited from the command economy 
period. Typically, the literature focuses on corruption, which has been extended to related 
(and highly correlated) institutional measures of rule of law, property rights and political 
freedom. The general consensus is that weaker institutions tend to undermine the prospect 
of FDI in the region.  
{Figure 1 about here} 
 Corruption may impose significant direct and indirect costs to firms. Direct costs 
typically take the form of “petty corruption” that is monetary payments or bribes extracted 
primarily by low level government officials, reducing the transaction costs associated with 
weak formal institutions, including the costs of delayed transactions through excessive 
power in the hands of local officials. However, the important point here is that while this 
type of corruption may in some cases decrease the difficulty of doing business, it still 
indicates higher transaction costs compared with the optimum case of functional formal 
institutions and no corruption. The petty corruption contrasts with what Rose –Ackerman 
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(1999) terms “grand corruption”, which in our context relates to nature of the interactions 
between inward investors and high-level government officials. This may for example 
involve assessments of the value of investment to the host country, and the nature of the 
incentives that may be offered. In turn this may be influenced by the degree of ownership 
the inward investment wishes to retain. In either case, the essential effect is that higher 
corruption indicates the underlying uncertainty of returns to foreign investment, which in 
turn deter FDI.    
While most studies find an inverse relationship between corruption and FDI, some 
suggest a positive impact of corruption on FDI, as for example, Egger and Winner (2005). 
We argue that these contradictions in the literature occur due to the failure for previous 
research to consider host country corruption, not merely in isolation, but also relative to 
home country corruption. For example, compared to Italian parent firms, Swedish parent 
firms may be more wary of investing in Romania because Sweden is significantly less 
corrupt than Italy (see Figure 1). Thus the degree of unfamiliarity of running a business in 
corrupt Romania is much higher for Swedish rather than Italian parent firms, which in turn 
result in lower returns to investment for Swedish firms. It may thus be possible that Italian 
parent firms may respond positively to host corruption in Romania while Swedish parent 
firms would do so negatively. In other words, a distinction between host corruption per se 
and the distance between host and home corruption1 is essential to understand the variation 
in FDI across the CEE countries. Using a large firm-level panel data-set from a sample of 
CEE host countries, the present paper examines the effects of corruption, absolute as well 
as relative, on foreign investment and, as such, departs from the existing literature. 
A related issue is that parent firms with greater knowledge intensity can be wary of 
protecting its knowledge advantage in a host country with greater corruption, as the 
probability of settling any dispute with a host partner (in a joint venture) fairly is rather low 
in a more corrupt environment. As a result, knowledge-intensive parent firms are likely to 
secure a controlling ownership when investing in more corrupt host countries (relative to 
home countries) in a bid to protect their knowledge. The latter allows us to address another 
                                                 
1 See section 3 for discussion about the choice of corruption indices. 
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gap in the literature and that is the interaction between relative corruption and technology 
transfer.  
Using matched information on parent firms and their foreign subsidiaries in CEE 
host countries for the period 1998-2006, the paper examines the empirical validity of these 
two hypotheses. Most existing studies exploring the impact of institutions on FDI (e.g., 
Kaufman et al. 1999; Henisz, 2000; Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Bevan and Estrin 2004; 
Merlevede and Schoors, 2009) focus on the FDI flows, and primarily use country-level 
data-sets, so say little directly about the motivation of firms to engage in FDI in a given 
location. In contrast to much of the existing literature in this area (with the exception of 
Hines (1995), Javorcik and Wei (2009) 2), we use data from about 58,000 host firms with 
some foreign investment drawn from 11 CEE countries spanning over 1998-2006; this 
allows us to update 1996 study of Javorcik and Wei (2009) as the process of economic 
reform has deepened in the region. Further, we include characteristics of both host and 
parent firms, but also unlike most existing studies we include measures of both absolute 
and relative host corruption. We not only consider parent firm’s entry decision, but also 
focus on the level of foreign ownership in host firms in our sample, after controlling for 
various firm-, industry-, and country level characteristics. Since corruption is difficult to 
measure, we experiment with a number of possible corruption measures including ICRG 
indices of freedom from corruption, bureaucratic quality and law and order (see further 
discussion in section 2 for choice of indices). We use Wooldridge (1995) selection model 
that controls for year-specific selectivity bias among host firms attracting foreign 
investment; our estimates provide some support to our central hypotheses and are robust to 
alternative specifications (see section 4).  
Building on Straub (2008)3 we contrast the importance of grand corruption with that 
of petty corruption (measured by bureaucratic quality) in the propensity of a given CEE 
firm to attract foreign investors. , other things remaining unchanged, greater relative 
corruption lowers foreign investment in a host country. Second, there is evidence of some 
heterogeneity among sample firms as relative corruption has a different effect on foreign 
                                                 
2 To the best of our knowledge, Javorcik (2004) and Javorcik and Wei (2009) are the only papers, which use 
multiple-country firm-level data to analyse the role of corruption on an outward investor’s entry mode in 
transition countries (see further discussion in section 4). 
3 Note that empirical analysis of Straub (2008) makes use of cross-country data from all countries (not firm-
level data from CEE countries as in our case). 
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investment by knowledge intensive firms who are likely to secure controlling stake in a bid 
to protect their knowledge advantage in a more corrupt environment (relative to their 
country of origin), once we control for the potential selectivity bias. Taken together, our 
results highlight the adverse effects of relative ‘grand corruption’ in our sample. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the econometric 
model while Section 3 describes the data set used in the analysis and presents descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 presents the results while the final section concludes. 
 
 
2. Data and some descriptive statistics 
The dataset used in this paper has primarily been drawn from ORBIS which is a 
comprehensive and rich firm-level dataset and has been widely used (e.g. Helpman et al. 
2004; Budd et al. 2005; Konings and Murphy 2006). It is provided by Bureau van Dijk 
(BvD)4, a leading electronic publisher of annual account information on several million 
private and public firms around the world.5  
 Compiling the information described above produces a large data-set spanning the 
period 1998-2006. Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of firms across the sample 
countries. Our sample of CEE host countries consists of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine.6 
{Table 1 about here}  
About 15% of sample host firms had some foreign investment. Table 2 shows the 
distribution of percentage of foreign ownership in our sample. In general average 
percentage of foreign ownership is high, the lowest being 58% in Ukraine.  Significant 
inter-country variation in foreign ownership is noteworthy too: the average is as high as 
89% in Czech Republic closely followed by Poland (87%), Estonia (83%), Slovakia and 
Romania (82%), Latvia (81%) and Hungary (81%). This is further reflected in the 
percentage distribution of firms with some foreign ownership: about 63% of all firms with 
                                                 
4 BvD is best known for databases, such as BANKSCOPE and FAME, which are widely subscribed to by UK 
Universities. It can also be compared with COMPUSTAT which is extensively used in the US. 
5 For further details of the data, see Temouri et al. (2008) 
6We did not include countries where we would had less than 5 firms (e.g. Macedonia, Moldova etc.). The 
smallest country in our sample has at least 100 firms at some point in the panel period. 
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positive foreign ownership have 90% or higher foreign ownership while as high as 56% of 
sample firms with positive foreign ownership have sole foreign ownership. 
{Table 2 about here} 
 There is a wide range of home countries in our sample. The list is dominated by 
foreign investors from the US and also the old EU countries including France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, UK, Denmark and Sweden. There are also parent firms from other 
OECD (e.g., Australia, Canada, Japan), newly emerging (e.g., Brazil, China, India and 
Russia) countries as well as those from the middle-east (e.g., Israel, Lebanon, Syria, 
Turkey). Table 3 shows the distribution of the most important home countries (in terms of 
highest frequency) in our sample. While Baltic countries tend to have major investment 
from parent firms from Scandinavian countries, German firms are key investors in Central 
Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), and Italian firms are major investors in 
Romania. The latter seems to highlight the aspect of physical proximity in foreign 
investment, important exception being the US firms are visible in all the sample countries, 
most notably in Latvia, Ukraine, Slovakia and Bulgaria.   
{Table 3 about here} 
 Knowledge intensity of parent firms is central to an understanding of the nature of 
foreign investment in host countries. Hence, we use share of intangible assets (in total 
assets) to classify parent firms into high-tech and low-tech categories. Firms, whose share 
of intangible assets are greater than or equal to the 90th percentile value in the sample, are 
classified as high-tech knowledge-intensive firms.7 The distribution of percentage of 
foreign ownership for high-tech and low-tech firms are shown in Table 4. It follows that 
there is practically no difference between high/low tech firms when we consider majority 
foreign ownership>50%. Yet the distribution of partial ownership, i.e., when foreign 
ownership<50% is rather different for high tech firms; generally a lower proportion of 
high-tech firms tend to have minority ownership. The latter justifies our decision to focus 
on continuous foreign ownership pattern rather than a distinction between sole/joint foreign 
ownership as some of the previous studies have done. 
                                                 
 
7 We did robustness checks taking lower thresholds, down to 75th percentile of the share – the results were 
not affected. Similar results are obtained when we substitute our measure of high technology profile with the 
use of OECD industry classification to distinguish high-tech firms from others. These results are available on 
request. 
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{Table 4 about here} 
Our analysis of the impact of institutions on foreign ownership primarily focuses on 
the role of corruption. This has two advantages. First, as already argued corruption can be 
seen as a key single indicator of institutional quality as it reflects the impact of underlying 
institutional inputs (including poor protection of property rights, excessive and arbitrary 
regulation, and weak informal institutions that is norms and values shaping human 
behaviour) into one output indicator that describes the quality of the interface between 
businesses and public administration. Moreover, unlike most other institutional indicators, 
corruption indicators are not expert-assessment based but result from survey data based on 
experience of businesses. While those data capture the perceptions of business 
environment, the issue of subjectivity is more apparent than real, as the real life business 
decisions are driven by the same perceptions of the decision makers.  
Corruption is multi-dimensional and difficult to quantify. We primarily rely on data 
on corruption (see footnote to Table 5 for the variable definition) from International Risk 
Country Guide compiled by Political Risk Services Group, which are consistent with 
measures available either directly from Transparency International or from Heritage 
Foundation/ Wall Street Journal.8 A high value of the index suggests that the high 
government officials are likely to demand high payments and illegal payments are expected 
throughout the lower level of the government in the form of bribes connected with import 
and export licenses, exchange control, tax assessment, policy protection or loans. The 
means and standard deviations of absolute and relative corruption indices in home and host 
countries are summarised in Appendix Table A1. On average, both absolute and relative 
corruption indices are higher for host countries (relative to home countries), with the 
important exception of Italy.  
Other corruption measures, e.g. Kaufmann et al. (1999) (which became Worldwide 
Governance Indicators project by World Bank) are also used (e.g., see  Javorcik and Wei, 
2009). Given the panel nature of our data, we could not use Kaufmann et al. (1999) 
measures as the time dimension is a particular problem. Kaufmann et al. standardise 
distributions for each year (with mean zero and standard deviation of one), so data is not 
                                                 
8 Using a sample of 32 developing countries, Morisset and Lumenga-Neso (2002) showed that higher costs 
and delays associated with various administrative barriers are strongly correlated with the prevailing level of 
corruption as captured by Transparency International Index. 
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comparable over time (see methodological description in Kaufmann et al., 2009). As 
possible alternative to the ICRG corruption index, we experiment with bureaucratic quality 
(e.g., see Straub, 2008) and the rule of law. This choice has been dictated by our focus on 
the extent to which measures of corruption impose higher transaction costs, and therefore 
induce businesses make certain decisions regarding ownership or control of certain assets. 
9As with the direct measure of corruption, our analysis includes both absolute and relative 
law and order and also those for bureaucratic quality while determining foreign ownership 
in our sample.  
 
3. An empirical model of corruption and FDI 
 There is a relatively large empirical literature that seeks to model FDI flows. For 
example, Markusen (2001), Helpman (1993) and Glass and Saggi (2002) examine the 
extent to which technology transfer is mitigated or enhanced by intellectual property rights 
(IPR) protection, but the findings of this literature essentially focus on the extent to which 
innovation is based on either direct or indirect mechanisms for international technology 
transfer. Then there is relatively limited firm-level analysis focusing on the impact of 
corruption on FDI (e.g., Hines, 1995; Javorcik 2004; Javorcik and Wei 2009). We update 
(using data for 1996-2007) and extend Javorcik and Wei (2009) with a broader perspective: 
instead of merely explaining the 100% foreign ownership, we examine the precise 
percentage of equity held by inward investors. This allows us to exploit the full variation in 
share of foreign ownership across a large sample of firms.  
Unlike most existing studies, we observe the exact share of foreign ownership in 
host firms. Accordingly, we can distinguish between the discrete act of FDI and the actual 
degree of foreign ownership in a host firm. In order to explain variation in foreign 
ownership, we employ Wooldridge (1995) estimator, essentially because this method 
allows us not only to select the firms that have attracted foreign investors, but also to 
                                                 
9 A high score for bureaucratic quality indicates "an established mechanism for recruitment and training," 
"autonomy from political pressure," "strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in government services". The rule of Law index instead reflects the government's administrative 
capacity to enforce the law, as well as the potential for rent seeking associated with weak legal systems and 
insecure property rights. While bureaucratic quality or rule of law is related to the corruption index, the link to 
corruption is rather indirect. 
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explain the share of foreign ownership in these firms after controlling for the year-specific 
selectivity bias; the latter is important in the analysis of panel data at our disposal. In 
contrast, the standard Heckman method (1979) leads to inconsistent estimates when applied 
to panel data. This is because the problems of selectivity and unobserved heterogeneity 
may occur simultaneously in the equation of interest, in which case the Heckman method 
can deal with the former but not the latter estimation bias. Wooldridge (1995) proposes an 
alternative estimator that tests and corrects for both potential sources of bias by allowing 
individual specific effects in both the selection equation and the outcome equation as well 
as considering the non-random nature of the sample over which the outcome equation is 
defined (Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina, 2007). It is similar to the Heckman selection 
model in that it starts by estimating the selection equation for each year t by standard 
probit, which in turn generates the inverse Mills ratio λt for year t for the sample MNE 
firms. Taken together, we obtain the matrix of inverse Mills ratios (IMR). The selection 
bias corrected estimates are then obtained by including the matrix Λit of inverse Mills ratios 
(i.e., the selection correction terms) for the whole sample period. A Wald test for the joint 
significance of Λit is robust to arbitrary serial correlation and heterogeneity, which also 
provides a test for sample selection bias. Appropriate standard errors and t-statistics are 
obtained using the standard bootstrapping approach suggested by Wooldridge (1995).10 
Moreover, following Petersen (2006), we cluster the errors by firms at the second stage 
such that the standard errors are robust to arbitrary within-firm residual correlation. 
Suppose in a given year the foreign ownership in the i-th host firm operating in the 
j-th sector is denoted by a binary variable Fijc*  where Fijc *is determined as follows:   
Fijc *= α0 + αx Xijct-1 + γj + γc+ εijc               
For a given year t, t=1998……2006, we use this ownership information Fijc * to construct 
the following binary foreign entry variable Fijc indicating whether the i-th host firm 
operating in the j-th sector in country c has been successful to get some foreign investment:  
Fijc = 1 if Fijct * >0  
Fijc = 0 if otherwise  
                                                 
10 Wooldridge (1995) has the added advantage in that it not only corrects for selection bias (as in Heckman, 
1979), but also control for the unobserved heterogeneity as in a standard fixed effects model.  Further, it 
allows for unbalanced panels, thus removing potential survivor bias, which does not affect the residual 
correlation property of this kind of model.  
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i.e.  Prob(Fijc = 1)  
=Prob(ܨ௜௝௖௧כ  > 0)  
= F(α0 + αx Xijct-1 + γj + γc)    (1) 
Equation (1) thus provides an underlying structural model for the determination of the 
probability of foreign investment in a host firm. X is the set of one-period lagged 
explanatory variables explaining this probability, namely, total factor productivity (TFP), 
firm size, intangible to total assets ratio and also the volume of cash available to the firm. 
Given the multi-level data at our disposal, we also allow for sector-specific (γj) and 
country-specific (γc) effects that capture common unobserved shocks at the respective level. 
The remaining errors are included in the independently and identically distributed error 
term . Estimation of equation (1) for each year t in the sample allows us to determine the 
inverse Mill’s ratios λt for the t-th year in our sample, t= 1998, …., 2006. 
  Subsequently, after selecting the firms with some foreign ownership (F=1), we 
estimate a second model (see equation 2 below) to determine the actual level of foreign 
ownership FOijct in i-th host firm in sector j, country c and year t as follows:   
ܨ௜௝௖௧כ = β0 + βz Zijct-1 + βH Hijct-1 + βcCct+ δj + δt+ t λt  + νijct   (2) 
where Z is the set of host firm characteristics, incorporating a subset of X from (1), H 
captures the home firm characteristics while C refers to the country-level characteristics, 
namely, measures of absolute and relative corruption, as defined earlier. While absolute 
corruption captures the underlying costs of running business in a host country, relative 
corruption captures the extent of unfamiliarity of the parent firm with a host environment. 
In equation (2), industry specific fixed effects are denoted by δj while year-specific fixed 
effects are δt. Note that λt’s account for the selectivity corrections in terms of inverse-Mill’s 
ratios, one for each year t obtained from estimation of equation (1) above. The remaining 
errors are included in the independently and identically distributed error term ν. 
Following Amiti and Wakelin (2003) we argue that characteristics of the host firms, 
namely, lagged values of firm size (medium and large), total factor productivity as well as 
cash, all play a crucial role for the probability in investing abroad. Note however that the 
cash variable is not included in equation (2) and thus serves as an important exclusion 
restriction for equation (2). Further equation (2) includes an index of market share that 
controls for competition, if any, from domestic firms in the industry, which is not included 
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in (1). The determination of the share of foreign ownership (i.e., equation 2) depends, in 
addition, on characteristics (namely, size and intangible assets share) of parent/home firms 
(H) and also the corruption measures: absolute and relative (distance) corruption indices, 
both of which are excluded from the estimation of equation (1). A further important 
distinction between (1) and (2) is the inclusion of the set of year-specific inverse Mills 
ratios (λt).  
Among the characteristics of home firms H we include assets-based size measures 
(medium and large) and also a binary measure of their knowledge intensity called ‘high-
tech’ derived from the share of intangible assets in total assets of the firm. The binary 
variable ‘high-tech’ is equal to one if the parent firm’s intangible assets is above the 90 
percentile value of its distribution and zero otherwise. We also examine the robustness of 
our measures by focusing on OECD definition of high-tech sectors. Accordingly, we define  
an alternative measure OECD_HT=1 if the firm belongs to manufacture of office 
machinery and computers, manufacture of electronic machinery and apparatus n.e.c., 
manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus and 
manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks as high-tech 
industries.11  (see further discussion in section 4.2).   
Our central hypotheses correspond to the estimated coefficients βc’s of absolute  
corruption and relative corruption. In a bid to test our second hypothesis relating to the 
protection of knowledge advantage of high-tech firms, we augment equation (2) by 
including two more interaction terms, namely, high-tech*absolute corruption and high-
tech*relative corruption in an alternative specification and examine the signs and 
significance of these coefficients, ceteris paribus.  
Finally, we estimate an extended model that includes additional country-level 
explanatory variables with a view to eliminate competing hypotheses, if any. This includes  
GDP growth per capita (that measures the size of market activity), inflation rate (which 
may deter foreign investment as assets in the host country become devalued relative to the 
home country), openness to trade (greater openness may encourage more FDI) and 
corporate tax rates (tax incentives may encourage greater inward foreign investment) in the 
host country. The lack of familiarity with the host environment is likely to increase with the 
                                                 
11 OECD_HT=1 if the firms belong to OECD industry classification 16, 18, 19 and is zero otherwise. 
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physical distance, thus the costs associated with undertaking FDI are likely to be higher for 
more distant host countries. To this end we include a binary variable indicating whether the 
home country shares a common border with the host country. Inclusion of these additional 
variables allows us to identify the pure effect of absolute and relative corruption, after 
controlling for all possible factors that may also influence foreign ownership.  
Means and standard deviations of all regression variables are shown in Table 5. 
{Table 5 about here} 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Estimates of the first stage foreign entry selection equation (1) are shown in Appendix 
Table A2. Our primary focus in this paper is however on results derived from the 
estimation of equation (2) that determines the share of foreign ownership among host firms 
attracting some foreign investment. To this end, we estimate different specifications of 
equation (2). We first obtain the full sample Wooldridge estimates of equation (2), which 
implies we cannot include any characteristics of parent firms. Estimates of equation (2) 
using the full sample of observations are summarised in Table 6. This then allows us to test 
the effect of absolute corruption (using our panel data) on foreign ownership, much in line 
with the existing literature that overwhelmingly uses single cross-section data (section 5.1). 
Next we use home-host matched sample and include various characteristics of 
parent firms (see Table 7) with a view to test the importance of both absolute and relative 
corruption (section 5.2), after controlling for all other possible factors. This is a more 
interesting case as we are also able to control for some characteristics of home firms and 
home-host institutional differences (while it comes at cost of losing some observations). 
These estimates are shown in Table 7. 
We also check the robustness of our estimates in a number of ways: (i) we include a 
number of additional host country controls like GDP growth, common border, corporate 
taxes, inflation and index of trade liberalisation to see if the central result still holds. (ii) We 
examine the validity of our results in two sub-samples, namely, CEE countries who joined 
EU by 2004 and 2007. (iii) We test the validity of our central hypothesis for sole foreign 
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proprietorship in the CEE region. (iv) We also estimate the effect of corruption on 
investment in host CEE countries by selected home countries. 
Finally, we assess the specific implications of institutions (both absolute and 
relative corruption) for knowledge intensive high-tech parent firms. In doing so, we include 
interaction between high-tech dummy and the two measures of corruption (Table 8). We 
also check the robustness of these estimates by focusing on an alternative definition of 
high-tech industries, using the OECD classification (see section 3).   
 
4.1. Discussion of results: the role of absolute corruption 
 We start our analysis with full sample estimates of equation (2) determining the 
percentage of foreign ownership in the CEE host countries as shown in Table 6 (the 
corresponding first stage probit estimates of equation (1) are shown in Appendix Table 
A2).  
{Table 6 about here} 
This is the simplest specification, and can be thought of as the baseline model, focusing on 
characteristics of host firms that explain the probability of a given firm to attract foreign 
investment, and subsequently the scale of that investment, allowing for the selection effect 
discussed above. Selectivity corrected Wooldridge estimates of percentage of foreign 
ownership is in conformity with the existing literature that corruption is inversely related to 
FDI flows. That is, ceteris paribus, the host firms in more corrupt countries tend to have 
significantly lower foreign ownership, compared with similar firms in countries with less 
corruption. 
Other results too are very much as expected. Larger firms are visible internationally 
and are more likely to attract foreign investment at a larger scale in terms of percentage 
ownership compared with both medium and small size companies (Bishop et al., 2002). 
Coefficient of market share of the host firm however is negative, which matches the results 
reported elsewhere for China (Du et al. 2007) and India (Bhaumik et al. 2010). Equally 
interesting is that performance in terms of total factor productivity is more important in 
explaining investment in CEE countries than are intangible assets. It is clear, and not 
surprising, that the best performing firms attract greater foreign investment; in contrast, the 
motivation for investing in CEE countries does not appear to be knowledge acquisition. 
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This is reflected in the insignificant coefficient of intangible assets of the host country firms 
in Table 6. 
 
4.2. Role of absolute and relative corruption 
 It is however more interesting to consider the estimates presented in Table 7 where 
we include variables relating to both host and home firms/countries. By construction, this 
focuses only on those firms that for some point in the period had foreign investment. The 
results are corrected to allow for the obvious selectivity bias that would ensue from treating 
this sample as a random sample from the wider population (corresponding first-stage probit 
selection estimates are shown in Appendix Table A2). In this respect, we consider estimates 
for four specifications (1)-(4) of Table 7.  
{Table 7 about here} 
Specification (1) includes only host country characteristics (including host country 
corruption index) with control for industry and year specific fixed effects; these estimates 
are rather comparable to those shown in Table 6 though obtained from a different sample. 
Specification (2) supplements specification (1) by two variables indicating parent firm size, 
namely, medium and large and also a dummy variable indicating if the parent firm is a 
high-tech one (as defined above). Specification (3) augments specification (2) by the 
measure of relative corruption while specification (4) includes EBRD infrastructure index;  
access to local public infrastructure could boost foreign investment, as it may lower the 
costs of new investment (a la Aschauer, 1989, Barro, 1990). 
Wald test for the joint significance of the inverse Mill’s ratios in each specification 
is significant, thus justifying the use of Wooldridge (1995) model. 
Results of specification (1), presented in Table 7 are rather similar to those in Table 
6. So we start with the analysis of specification (2) that includes parent firm size (medium 
and large) and also the indicator if the parent firm is high-tech or not; other variables are 
the same as shown in Table 6. Intangible assets of the host firms are still marginally 
insignificant, but it appears that the high-tech parent firms (knowledge-intensive firms with 
very high level of intangible assets) tend to have lower foreign ownership in the sample 
countries. The result remains unchanged when we augment specification (2) by including 
additional arguments in specifications (3) and (4). It is interesting to note how the estimates 
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of specification (3), for example, change from specification (1) or for that matter from those 
shown in Table 6. The size of host firm turns insignificant as we control for the size of the 
home firm and its technological profile. More interestingly, estimates from specifications 
(3) and (4) highlight a significant effect of relative corruption on foreign investment: other 
things remaining unchanged, greater relative corruption between host and home country is 
associated with lower foreign ownership in our sample.  
In order to assess the robustness of our corruption results, next we consider 
estimates of specifications (5) and (6) that replace absolute and relative corruption 
measures by (a) absolute and relative law and order and (b) absolute and relative 
bureaucratic quality respectively. The signs on the bureaucratic quality terms are as 
expected, and the same as for grand corruption, but the effect of poor bureaucratic quality is 
much weaker. This suggests that while lower bureaucratic quality does deter FDI, but is 
less important than grand corruption. Building on Straub (2008) these differences are 
highlighted when considering not just corruption levels but relative corruption. Poor law 
and order also deters FDI, however law and order measures the need to protect physical 
property rather than investment capital or technology, and so while poor law and order 
deters FDI, it has no differential effect on FDI by level of technology of the parent (see 
further discussion in section 4.3 below).     
 
4.2.1. Robustness checks 
To gain more confidence in our central results, we performed a series of additional 
robustness checks. First, we included additional control variables with a view to eliminate 
competing hypotheses. Significant negative effect of relative corruption holds even when 
we include additional host country controls, namely, common border with the parent 
country, corporate taxes, inflation, GDP growth (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Next, we 
use the same specification to estimate the percentage of foreign ownership equation for all 
firms where there has been no change of foreign ownership over the period and obtain the 
same negative effect of relative corruption, again confirming our central result.  
Second, we consider two sub-samples to test the robustness of our results:  (a) all 
CEE countries that joined the EU by 2004 (this excludes Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and 
Ukraine) and (b) also all CEE countries who joined the EU by 2007 (which excludes Russia 
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and Ukraine).12 Validity of a negative effect of greater relative corruption on foreign 
investment in host countries is found for both subsamples.  
One advantage of using firm level data, compared with the macro level studies 
discussed above, is that one can examine different degrees of FDI, in terms of the level of 
foreign ownership. We therefore examine specifically the relationship between relative 
corruption and the propensity for 100% foreign ownership. Considering the firms with 
some foreign investment, we run both a probit and a logit regressions. These results 
summarised in Table 8 further confirm the pronounced effect of relative corruption on 
100% foreign ownership, suggesting that greater degree of relative corruption would 
enhance the likelihood of a joint venture. 
In order to further explore the role of relative corruption on foreign investment in 
our sample, we next obtain the effects of host corruption on foreign investment by selected 
home countries in our sample, after controlling for the same set of explanatory variables 
(naturally using specification (2) of Table 7). These results summarized in Table 9 
highlight the varying effect (positive and negative) of host corruption depending on the 
country of origin of the parent firm. While the effect is significant and negative for firms 
from the US, Norway and Sweden (low corruption countries), it is positive and significant 
for the Spanish and Italian parent firms (relatively higher corruption countries) investing in 
the CEE region. In this context, it is interesting to compare the US case with the Italian case 
as their corruption profiles are rather different (see Table A1). These results are in line with 
much of the management literature concerning FDI and corruption, although typically this 
is not tested. US firms, with a large domestic market and the lowest level of domestic 
corruption are those most deterred by corruption abroad. At the other end of the scale, 
Italian firms are well versed in operating in a weak institutional environment, and one of 
their firm specific advantages is in operating in such countries. Italian firms seem therefore 
to be attracted to such locations, where others may fear to tread. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first result that highlights large inter-country differences in the 
relationship between corruption (both absolute and relative) and FDI. 
 
4.3. Protection of advanced knowledge 
                                                 
12 These results are not shown, but will be available on request. 
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 Technology transfer remains central to explaining foreign investment. There is 
however an additional dimension to technology transfer when we consider corruption in 
host countries in relation to that in home countries. The latter relates to our second 
hypothesis pertaining to the protection of parent firms’ knowledge intensity in more corrupt 
host countries (relative to home countries). Accordingly, we augment specification (3) of 
Table 7 by including two interaction terms, namely, high-tech*absolute corruption and 
high-tech*relative corruption. These augmented estimates are shown in Table 10, 
illustrating the estimates from two specifications.13 Column 1 of Table 10 shows the 
estimates using our definition of high-tech, i.e., when parent firms’ intangible assets is 
greater than the 90 percentile value of the variable in our sample. We also show the 
alternative estimates using OECD definitions of high-tech (OECD_HT) industries as 
defined in section 3 (column 2).  
While the high-tech dummy (pertaining to parent firms) and also its interaction with 
host corruption cease to be significant in this case, its interaction with the relative 
corruption measure turns out to be positive and highly significant. In other words, high-tech 
parent firms are likely to secure a controlling stake if the relative corruption is high in the 
host country. Next we examine the robustness of this result by focusing on OECD 
definition of high-tech firms (i.e., OECD_HT). We also have two interactions between this 
high-tech variable and absolute and relative corruption respectively. Note that the 
interaction term between OECD_HT and relative corruption is significant and positive, as 
before. 
However when we replace absolute and relative corruption by the alternative 
absolute and relative law and order indices, the interaction terms between high-tech dummy 
and absolute/relative law and order indices cease to be significant.14 While law and order as 
such helps protect property, it does not protect technology. As such, it does impact on the 
foreign firms’ decision to invest, and the stake to hold, but does not impact differentially on 
technology. Thus insignificance of law and order index in fact backs up our previous result, 
that it is ‘grand’ corruption which not only affects FDI, but also knowledge advantage high-
tech parent firms. 
                                                 
13 These estimates remain unchanged even when we use specification (4) of Table 7. 
14 As before, Bureaucratic quality indices (absolute and relative) fail to have any perceptive effect on 
knowledge intensive firms. For brevity we do not show these results, which are available on request. 
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Taken together, there is evidence that in a bid to protect their knowledge advantage, 
high-tech parent firms’ tend to secure a controlling stake in a host country with a more 
corrupt environment (relative to the home country). This is because costs of joint ventures 
arising from disagreements between partners, diffusion of proprietary information may be 
rather high (e.g., see Gomes-Casseres, 1987); these costs may be even higher in more 
corrupt environment as the possibility of settling any dispute fairly would be rather low in 
this context. 
It is also interesting to calculate the marginal effect of absolute and relative 
corruption using estimates shown in column (1) of Table 10. The total marginal effect of 
absolute corruption turns out to be negative and is equal to -0.799, since the corresponding 
effect for high-tech firms remains insignificant. In addition, the effect of relative corruption 
is significant not only for all firms, but also for high-tech firms. Accordingly, the net effect 
of relative corruption on foreign ownership at the mean value of relative corruption turns 
out to be positive 2.069 (i.e., -0.523+2.592*1) for high-tech firms while it is -0.523 for 
other firms in our sample. In other words, ceteris paribus a unit increase in relative 
corruption, i.e., the corruption in host countries relative to that in home country, tends to 
increase foreign ownership by about 2 percentage point for knowledge-intensive high-tech 
firms in our sample. The latter seems to be an adoption mechanism for high-tech parent 
firms in a bid to protect their knowledge advantage when relative corruption is high in a 
host country.  Our country-specific estimates, as presented in Table 9 also corroborate this 
result. 
 
4.4. Comparison with existing literature 
 The present paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. A 
relevant reference point is Javorcik and Wei (2009), who use 1996 cross-section data from 
451 parent firms drawn from a number of eastern European transition countries to analyse 
the incidence of joint venture as opposed to sole proprietorship. Using a more recent panel 
data 1998-2006, we argue that while an analysis of sole/joint venture is important on its 
own right, it is also essential to understand the actual level of participation of a foreign firm 
in a host transition country, especially from a policy point of view. This in turn allows us to 
exploit the full variation in the continuous foreign ownership variable. We have over 
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58,000 host firms with some foreign investment drawn from 11 countries spanning over a 
period of more than 10 years (the sample size, however, gets somewhat smaller when we 
consider the matched sample of home-host firms). Thus our analysis is broader in scope as 
we not only include characteristics of both host and parent firms, but also unlike most 
existing studies include measures of both absolute and relative corruption (and other related 
indices) and also their interactions with knowledge advantage of high-tech parent firms in 
host countries.  
Our analysis distinguishes market entry of foreign firms (first stage) from the actual 
level of foreign ownership (second stage); thus we are able to control for the potential 
selection bias in determining the level of foreign ownership in the sample. We make use of 
Wooldridge (1995) that allows us to generate year-specific selectivity parameters from the 
first stage market entry equation, which are then included in the determination of foreign 
ownership (see further discussion in section 5).15 There is evidence from our analysis that 
the percentage of foreign shares held in a host firm depends on both absolute and relative 
corruption in our sample. Other factors remaining unchanged, relative corruption, i.e., the 
distance in corruption between home and host countries, tends to lower foreign ownership 
and encourages joint venture. The effect is however different for high-tech parent firms 
who tend to secure controlling stakes while investing in more corrupt environment. These 
estimates are robust to alternative specifications and also use of alternative sub-samples. 
There is however confirmation that it is the relative ‘grand’ corruption, rather than law and 
order or bureaucratic quality, that discourage foreign investors to increase investment in 
CEE sample countries. 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
There are high costs of corruption for foreign investment. While much of the existing 
literature takes account of absolute corruption in the host country, the present paper argues 
that it is also important to take account of the host corruption in relation to the home 
corruption, which we label as relative corruption.  The latter is taken to be a measure of 
                                                 
15 In order to check the robustness of Wooldridge estimates, we compare these estimates with available 
alternatives like tobit and quantile regressions; however the sample results generally highlight the superiority 
of Wooldridge estimates. 
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home firms’ unfamiliarity of host environment, which may particularly pose obstacles to 
firm performance. Knowledge-intensive parent firms are however likely to behave 
differently: once decided to invest, they are likely to secure a controlling stake with a view 
to protect their knowledge advantage, as the stakes in a joint venture are too high especially 
in more corrupt environment. 
Using Orbis host-home matched firm-level panel dataset for the period 1998-2006 
from a group of CEE emerging countries, the paper tests the validity of these hypotheses. 
After controlling for all other factors, results suggest validity of our central hypotheses: (i) 
percentage of foreign shares held in host firms decline with greater relative corruption and 
also (ii) knowledge intensive high-tech parent firms behave differently from other firms in 
that, once decided to invest, they are more likely to secure controlling stakes in more 
corrupt host CEE countries. The latter can be attributed to the sensitivity of high-tech 
parent firms to share their knowledge advantage with host firms in a more corrupt 
environment.  This is because the probability of settling any dispute with a host partner 
fairly is rather low in such an environment. Results are robust to various alternative 
specifications and sub-samples used. There is also suggestion that it is the relative ‘grand’ 
corruption rather than weak rule of law or bureaucratic quality, that discourages foreign 
investment in sample host countries. 
An important policy implication of the inverse relationship between relative 
corruption and foreign ownership is that, ceteris paribus, a host economy with greater 
corruption and therefore weak institutions is more likely to attract foreign investors from 
countries with similar institutional set up, which minimises the institutional distance 
between host and home countries . This conclusion is consistent with the global trends of 
the recent growth of foreign investors from emerging economies investing in various 
emerging host countries. We thus believe that our results have wider implications, reaching 
beyond the region defined by our sample boundaries. 
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Table 1 Distribution of host firms in the sample (1998-2006) 
Country Frequency % of total observations
Bulgaria 1,682 2.80
Croatia 1,149 1.91
Czech Republic 4,025 6.70
Estonia 1,857 3.09
Hungary 121 0.20
Lithuania 1,427 2.38
Latvia 827 1.38
Poland 6,986 11.63
Romania 15,648 26.05
Russia 22,113 36.81
Slovakia 105 0.17
Ukraine 4,138 6.89
Total 60,078 100.00
 
Table 2. Distribution of foreign ownership 
 
  Percentage of firms when 
Host 
countries 
(1) % 
Foreign 
holding  
Mean (std dev) 
(2) 25%<= 
Foreign 
holding<50
% 
(3) Foreign holding 
>=50% 
(4) Foreign holding 
=100% 
Bulgaria 61.87 (36.39) 19.48 63.78 30.19 
Croatia 74.26 (35.32) 5.21 75.72 49.74 
Czech Rep. 88.73 (21.88) 8.42 92.40 67.86 
Estonia 83.12 (26.95) 13.53 86.02 61.55 
Hungary 79.62 (30.40) 11.95 84.06 48.21 
Lithuania 75.67 (29.39) 14.50 83.55 45.60 
Latvia 80.99 (29.03) 14.49 81.28 57.70 
Poland 86.61 (24.84) 7.02 89.37 61.14 
Romania 81.50 (27.84) 11.94 86.29 54.36 
Russia 74.45 (33.13) 14.91 76.22 45.37 
Slovakia 82.40 (25.33) 7.06 94.06 53.13 
Ukraine 58.00 (32.38) 22.36 58.54 14.03 
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Table 3 Distribution of home countries among the CEE host countries 
 
 Netherlands France UK Italy Germany US Others 
Host – CEE:        
Bulgaria 3.74 2.90 3.32 12.07 9.80 10.34 57.82
Croatia 4.56 2.08 2.28 11.65 19.14 4.43 55.86
Czech Rep. 13.56 8.07 4.14 2.52 32.60 9.16 29.95
Hungary 7.06 12.27 2.60 5.20 24.91 4.09 43.87
Poland 9.86 8.65 4.08 5.62 29.37 8.87 33.54
Romania 4.39 5.06 3.15 30.20 15.82 3.76 37.62
Russia 5.48 2.75 5.54 3.91 14.00 7.48 60.84
Slovakia 13.24 14.19 3.35 2.87 14.67 15.15 36.52
Ukraine 3.49 1.84 8.85 2.10 7.46 10.46 65.81
 
Host - Baltics: 
Germany Denmark Finland Sweden Norway US Others 
Estonia 6.16 4.62 39.50 23.89 4.80 3.68 17.35
Lithuania 9.87 10.52 8.90 14.24 15.37 4.21 36.89
Latvia 9.12 14.23 9.51 15.80 1.65 14.94 34.75
 
 
 
Table 4. Percentile distribution of foreign ownership if foreign ownership>0 
 
Percentile High-tech Low-tech 
1% 2 5.83 
5% 33.56 37 
10% 50 51 
25% 88.87 90 
50% 100 100 
75% 100 100 
90% 100 100 
95% 100 100 
99% 100 100 
Mean 86.96 88.29 
Observations 1,395 12,541 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics of regression variables 
Variable (definition) No of 
Obs.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
   
Host firm size: small 369291 .249998 .4330121 0 1
Host firm size: medium 369291 .5000041 .5000007 0 1
Host firm size: large 369291 .249998 .4330121 0 1
Host total factor productivity 293203 14.07085 103.9635 .0000275 29662.87
Host intangible/tangible assets (IATA) 368417 .0058332 .2291399 0 134.0892
Host firm Market share 362622 .000634 .005898 0 .9090915
Absolute corruption16 385542 3.763695 .8062952 1 5
Relative corruption 63473 -1.42580 1.25523 -5 4
Absolute law and order 385542 4.044914 .5048834 3 6
Relative law and order 63473 -.9593548 .8906618 -3 3.5
Absolute Bureaucratic quality 385542 1.521872 .8395015 1 4
Relative Bureaucratic quality 63473 -1.722241 1.012365 -3 3
Host EBRD infrastructure indicator 387831 2.775338 .4576038 1.7 3.7
Parent firm size: small 14576 .25 .4330276 0 1
Parent firm size: medium 14576 .5 .5000172 0 1
Parent firm size: large 14576 .25 .4330276 0 1
Parent firm high-tech 14347 .1000209 .3000383 0 1
Absolute difference in IATA 13508 .1100426 .3157898 0 30.59237
Diff. in IATA* corruption 13418 .2364209  1.40966 -152.961 4.113893
Diff. in IATA* relative corruption 13416 .1590978 .5160478 -40.7898 3.521779
Common border 64057 0.146713 0.353822 0 1
GDP growth per capita 387831 5.094573 3.494519 -6.1 12.23
Taxes on profits and capital gains 271066 10.88915 4.745271 4.45 23.71
Inflation rate 387831 20.07 45.70815 -1.18 1058.37
Index of trade liberalisation 387831 3.971646 0.301469 3.22 4.33
Cash flow 350453 -1168.75 817442.1 -4.8e+08 515850.3
Source: Authors’ calculations using Orbis database. All monetary values are deflated and in thousands of US 
dollars. 
 
 
  
                                                 
16 ICRG’s corruption index indicates the opinion of analysts on each country regarding the extent to which high 
government officials are likely to demand special payments, and illegal payments generally expected throughout lower 
levels of government in the form of bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, 
policy protection, or loans. It ranks nations on a scale from 0 to 6. A score of 0 represents maximum corruption level, 
while 6 indicates minimum corruption level. In our analysis ICRG’s corruption index is rescaled by subtracting country 
scores from 6 so that higher values correspond with higher levels of corruption. 
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Table 6 – Full sample Wooldridge estimates of % share of foreign ownership 
 Selection-corrected 
(Wooldridge) 
 Firms with foreign 
ownership (percentage)  
Explanatory variables  
Host firm size: medium 4.195*** 
 (0.204) 
Host firm size: large 12.49*** 
 (0.347) 
Total factor productivity 4.022*** 
 (0.177) 
Host intangible/tangible assets (IATA) 0.0597 
 (6.191) 
Host firm Market share -0.584*** 
 (0.0775) 
Host country corruption -4.674*** 
 (0.156) 
Industry Dummies Yes 
Year Dummies Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratios Yes 
Constant 26.23*** 
 (1.383) 
Observations 230,180 
R-squared 0.112 
Chi2 25,088.22*** 
Notes:  
(A) Corresponding first stage probit estimates are shown in Appendix A2. 
(B) Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (1000 repetitions);  
(C) Corrected for clustering for host countries.  
(D) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.   
(E) All regressors are lagged one period.  
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Table 7 – Absolute and Relative Corruption: Selection corrected Wooldridge 
estimates of % share of foreign ownership (host-home matched sample) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Host firm size: medium 1.613*** -0.696 -0.562 -0.57 -0.604 -0.717 
 (0.457) (1.484) (1.481) (1.476) (1.472) (1.476) 
Host firm size: large 1.341** -0.534 -0.339 -0.967 -1.124 -1.063 
 (0.656) (1.692) (1.687) (1.677) (1.680) (1.684) 
Host TFP 3.008*** 2.859*** 2.865*** 2.466*** 2.424*** 2.467*** 
 (0.265) (0.408) (0.408) (0.403) (0.403) (0.404) 
Host IATA 1.105 0.321 0.339 0.290 0.261 0.264 
 (5.759) (3.706) (3.726) (3.496) (3.504) (3.559) 
Host Market share -1.303*** -1.061*** -1.113*** -1.201*** -1.208*** -1.149*** 
 (0.132) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.221) (0.235) 
Host infrastructure    7.671*** 8.045*** 7.248*** 
    (1.178) (1.137) (1.200) 
Host law and order    3.343*** 4.135***  
    (0.651) (0.686)  
Relative  Law and Order     -0.624**  
     (0.272)  
Absolute Host corruption -7.240*** -2.940*** -3.038*** -0.975*   
 (0.339) (0.549) (0.552) (0.588)   
Relative  Corruption   -0.369* -0.363*   
   (0.205) (0.204)   
Absolute Bureaucratic Quality      0.695 
      (0.480) 
Relative Bureaucratic Quality      0.103 
      (0.390) 
Parent firm High-tech   -5.758*** -5.752*** -5.470*** -5.473*** -5.485*** 
  (0.966) (0.965) (0.973) (0.971) (0.977) 
Parent firm: medium  6.263*** 6.260*** 6.034*** 6.029*** 6.143*** 
  (0.715) (0.715) (0.710) (0.706) (0.707) 
Parent firm large  6.502*** 6.513*** 6.040*** 5.986*** 6.181*** 
  (0.978) (0.978) (0.980) (0.975) (0.973) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratios Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 91.944*** 83.867*** 82.906*** 39.07*** 31.49*** 50.54*** 
 (2.581) (4.402) (4.416) (7.208) (6.177) (5.582) 
Observations 42,668 9,313 9,313 9,313 9313 9313 
R-squared 0.047 0.048 0.049 0.056 0.056 0.053 
Chi2 2085.10*** 501.46*** 503.50*** 558.38*** 558.63*** 528.50*** 
 
Notes: (A) Selection-corrected (Wooldridge) estimator;   
  (B) Corresponding first stage probit estimates are shown in Appendix Table A2.   
  (C) Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (1000 repetitions);  
  (D) Corrected for clustering for host countries.   
  (E) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.  
  (F) All regressors are lagged one period. 
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Table 8. Probit maximum likelihood estimates of 100% foreign ownership 
 
 (1) (2) 
 100% foreign ownership 
VARIABLES Probit Logit 
Host firm size: medium 0.160* 0.250* 
 (0.0893) (0.150) 
Host firm size: large 0.165 0.254 
 (0.102) (0.170) 
Host TFP 0.282*** 0.473*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0483) 
Host IATA 0.0511 0.0829 
 (0.0771) (0.137) 
Host Market share -0.130*** -0.218*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0234) 
Absolute corruption -0.279*** -0.458*** 
 (0.0338) (0.0564) 
Relative corruption -0.109*** -0.180*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0216) 
Parent high-tech -0.273*** -0.443*** 
 (0.0544) (0.0890) 
Parent firm: medium 0.316*** 0.527*** 
 (0.0383) (0.0633) 
Parent firm large 0.427*** 0.711*** 
 (0.0527) (0.0868) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratios Yes Yes 
Constant -1.919*** -3.184*** 
 (0.328) (0.541) 
Observations 9400 9400 
R-squared 0.0518 0.0520 
Chi2 636.37*** 638.75*** 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9. Marginal effect of host corruption by home country 
 
home country Effect of absolute 
corruption 
Estimate (se) 
Observations 
US -9.74** (3.96) 582 
Germany -1.51 (1.93) 1061 
UK 3.56 (3.03) 469 
Spain 9.26* (4.96) 164 
Italy 5.73** (2.73) 1,195 
Finland 0.69 (1.91) 725 
Norway -13.13** (4.75) 168 
Sweden -3.82** (1.33) 759 
Note: Other explanatory variables are as included in specification (2), Table 7. 
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Table 10. Protection of advanced knowledge: Selection-corrected Wooldridge 
estimates of % share of foreign ownership 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Host firm size: medium -0.625 -1.141 
 (1.482) (1.309) 
Host firm size: large -0.498 -1.478 
 (1.687) (1.544) 
Host TFP 2.787*** 2.497*** 
 (0.406) (0.407) 
Host IATA 0.369 0.390 
 (3.697) (4.082) 
Host market share -1.077*** -0.933*** 
 (0.222) (0.222) 
Absolute Host corruption -2.831*** -3.350*** 
 (0.562) (0.538) 
Relative  Corruption -0.540** -0.491** 
 (0.212) (0.210) 
Parent High-tech 6.209  
 (6.066)  
Parent firm OECD High-tech   -5.200 
  (7.507) 
Parent firm: medium 6.238*** 6.418*** 
 (0.714) (0.702) 
Parent firm large 6.489*** 4.489*** 
 (0.979) (0.893) 
Parent High-tech*absolute corruption -1.963  
 (1.826)  
Parent High-tech*relative corruption 2.704***  
 (0.923)  
Parent OECD High-tech* absolute corruption 2.021 
  (2.135) 
Parent OECD High-tech*relative corruption  1.715* 
  (0.990) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratios Yes Yes 
Constant 82.37*** 86.84*** 
 (4.427) (4.154) 
Observations 9313 9747 
R-squared 0.050 0.044 
Chi square (LR statistic) 506.11*** 447.48*** 
Notes: (A) Selection-corrected (Wooldridge) estimator;   
  (B) Corresponding first stage probit estimates are shown in Appendix Table A2.   
  (C) Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (1000 repetitions);  
  (D) Corrected for clustering for host countries.   
  (E) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.  
              (F) All regressors are lagged one period. 
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Figure 1. Regional distribution of World FDI flows in 2007 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Absolute and relative corruption by home and host countries 
 
 Absolute corruption Relative corruption 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
 Home countries 
US 1.8166 0.3904 1.7707 0.8947 
UK 1.3125 0.2673 2.1835 0.7548 
France 2.675 0.4090 0.7977 0.4569 
Germany 1.4833 0.4419 1.8402 0.7536 
Netherlands 0.5167 0.5118 2.7029 0.6479 
Italy 3.0958 0.5429 0.2403 0.3417 
Spain 1.8917 0.5497 0.8458 0.5433 
Denmark 0.3083 0.2665 2.8777 0.7839 
Sweden 0.4083 0.4521 2.5022 0.8147 
Norway 1.0 0.0 2.1431 0.8867 
 Host countries 
Bulgaria 3.275 0.9607 0.5719 0.5979 
Croatia 3.181 0.4797 1.2313 1.1110 
Czech Rep.  2.7291 0.7436 0.9789 0.7418 
Estonia 2.3229 0.9516 1.4043 0.8357 
Hungary 2.1917 1.0092 1.0491 0.6939 
Latvia 3.6458 0.4915 0.8096 0.6531 
Lithuania 3.3594 0.2929 0.7763 0.5457 
Poland 2.9958 1.1796 0.6685 0.5247 
Romania 3.3375 0.3559 0.3822 0.4306 
Russia 4.4458 0.4739 1.0969 0.9448 
Slovakia 2.9583 0.6517 0.8198 0.6352 
Ukraine 4.1250 0.7971 0.7642 0.5859   
        Source: ICRG
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Appendix Table A2: Probit estimates of whether a firm has any foreign investment 
 
 
Variables 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
TFP 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.042*** 0.070*** 0.054*** 0.042*** 0.053*** 0.060*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Medium-size 0.131*** 0.157*** 0.181*** 0.178*** 0.179*** 0.118*** 0.116*** 0.130*** 0.115*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Large-size 0.357*** 0.349*** 0.397*** 0.414*** 0.419*** 0.341*** 0.354*** 0.380*** 0.375*** 
 (0.034) (0.030) (0.026) (0.023) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) 
Host IATA 0.399*** 0.307** 0.369*** 0.245*** -0.001 0.223*** 0.140*** 0.130*** 0.113** 
 (0.125) (0.124) (0.104) (0.080) (0.005) (0.053) (0.049) (0.051) (0.053) 
Cash 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,390 14,310 17,324 22,189 25,588 42,968 48,098 48,758 44,287 
R-squared 
(pseudo) 
0.125 0.120 0.125 0.127 0.138 0.191 0.186 0.175 0.167 
F-stat (Wald) 1515.42 1880.00 2382.97 3047.52 3829.52 7465.10 
8028.21 
 7730.36 6672.66 
Note: These are the estimates of equation (1) determining the likelihood of foreign investment. Coefficients are the marginal effects. 
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Appendix Table A3.  Wooldridge estimates of an extended model  
 (1) All firms 
with FO 
(2)All firms 
with stable FO 
VARIABLES FO_percentage FO_percentage 
host_medium 1.445 3.480** 
 (1.683) (1.766) 
host_large 1.204 3.442* 
 (1.886) (2.015) 
log_tfp 2.580*** 3.062*** 
 (0.492) (0.539) 
Host_IATA 3.648 -4.276 
 (6.996) (7.784) 
log_mkt_share -1.308*** -1.555*** 
 (0.246) (0.275) 
Absolute corruption -2.300*** -1.520* 
 (0.740) (0.851) 
Relative corruption -0.453* -0.566** 
 (0.246) (0.275) 
Parent_HT -5.912*** -7.128*** 
 (0.936) (1.115) 
Parent_medium 6.498*** 7.231*** 
 (0.685) (0.759) 
Parent_large 6.979*** 8.950*** 
 (0.921) (1.049) 
Common border 3.300*** 3.533*** 
 (0.767) (0.875) 
GDP growth per capita -0.0934 0.207 
 (0.161) (0.182) 
Share of corporate taxes 0.162*** 0.287*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0431) 
Inflation rate 0.156** 0.212** 
 (0.0737) (0.0834) 
Index of trade liberalisation 13.11*** 15.34*** 
 (2.612) (2.907) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratios Yes Yes 
Constant -25.71* -19.77 
 (14.55) (15.70) 
Observations 7807 6520 
R-squared 0.064 0.086 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See definitions of additional variables in 
Appendix Table A4. 
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Table A4. Definitions of Additional Variables 
 
EBRD Trade and foreign exchange index is taken to be a measure of liberalisation and is 
defined on a scale of 1-4+ as follows: 
 
1 Widespread import and/or export controls or very limited legitimate 
access to foreign exchange. 
 
2 Some liberalisation of import and/or export controls; almost full 
current account convertibility in principle, but with a foreign exchange 
regime that is not fully transparent (possibly with multiple exchange 
rates). 
 
3 Removal of almost all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions; 
almost full current account convertibility. 
 
4 Removal of all quantitative and administrative import and export 
restrictions (apart from agriculture) and all significant export tariffs; insignificant direct 
involvement in exports and imports by ministries and state-owned trading companies; no 
major non-uniformity of customs duties for non-agricultural goods and services; full and 
current account convertibility. 
 
4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: 
removal of most tariff barriers; membership in WTO. 
 
Common border is a dummy that takes a value 1 if Foreign-investor-country is bordering 
Host-country; it is 0 otherwise. 
 
GDP per capita growth (annual %); source: World Development Indicators 
 
Share of corporate taxes on profits and capital gains (% of total taxes); source: World 
Development Indicators 
 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %); source: World Development Indicators 
 
